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Social Demand and the Social Purpose of  History: 
What is Missing from Alun Munslow’s Classification  
of  Historiography?1
László Vörös
Insitute of  History, Slovak Academy of  Sciences2
Alun Munslow proposed a threefold classification of  historians’ approaches to the 
writing of  history. According to Munslow, every historian is either a reconstructionist, 
constructionist, or deconstructionist, depending on his/her fundamental 
epistemological/ontological beliefs concerning the possibilities of  studying and 
representing the “past” in the form of  narrative. I suggest that the category of  
constructionism as defined by Munslow is based on a priori presumptions about 
historians’ alleged beliefs in the ontic nature of  the “before now” and its knowability. 
The actual practice of  scholarly history writing allows for a more nuanced typology. 
I argue for a looser association of  formal and methodological criteria with the basic 
ontological/epistemological positions of  historians. I also argue that Munslow’s category 
of  constructionism should be split into two ideal-typical categories: constructionism-
proper and constructionism-improper. His deep insight into the formal aspects of  
history representation notwithstanding, Munslow’s theory fails to explain why there 
are such diverse and completely contradictory epistemologies within a single discipline. 
Neither does it explain the seemingly paradoxical continued domination of  (in Munslow’s 
view) two fallacious epistemologies: the reconstructionist and the constructionist. Why 
has reconstructionism, the most obsolete of  the three epistemological positions, not 
vanished after many decades of  intense criticism? I suggest that we should look for 
answers in the extra-disciplinary domain of  the social functions of  history. I argue 
that the social purpose of  the knowledge produced by historians and the interaction 
between historians and the public have a decisive formative influence on both the 
theory and the practice of  the discipline. Historians who fit into the epistemological 
categories of  reconstructionism and constructionism-improper are able to provide 
accounts that legitimize social institutions, political regimes, economical systems, social 
orders, etc. Even more importantly, the histories constructed by this kind of  historian 
often serve to anchor narratives (of  self-identification) connected to referential social 
1  The research and writing of  this paper were supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency 
under the contract No. APVV-14-0644 – Continuities and discontinuities of  political and social elites in Slovakia in 
19th and 20th centuries; this paper is in part a product of  the project Methods of  investigation of  the phenomena 
of  nationalism in historical research (Interdisciplinary inspirations), which enjoys the support of  the Institute of  
History, Slovak Academy of  Sciences, P. O. Box 198, Klemensova 19, 814 99 Bratislava, Slovakia.
2  Senior researcher, Institute of  History, Slovak Academy of  Sciences, P. O. Box 198, Klemensova 19, 
814 99 Bratislava, Slovakia; e-mail: histvoro@savba.sk
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groups and categories. I suggest that reconstructionist and constructionist-improper 
historians can serve these societal functions because their accounts are based on 
realist-empiricist epistemologies congruent with naïve perceptions of  the “past.” 
Furthermore, the constructionist-proper and deconstructionist historians not only do 
not offer legitimizing or identification narratives, their narratives of  history are based on 
counterintuitive epistemology informed by constructivist social scientific theory. Their 
analyses often deconstruct the very notions upon which legitimizing and anchoring 
discourses are based. I suggest that the social functions of  historical knowledge are 
thus an aspect that must be incorporated into epistemological studies of  history and 
historiography.
Keywords: Social functions of  history, Alun Munslow, epistemology, reconstructionism, 
constructionism, deconstructionism, self-identification, anchoring
In his works,3 philosopher of  history and historian Alun Munslow has masterfully 
introduced the main themes of  the philosophy of  history in the past half-
century. Taking first and foremost the ideas of  postmodernist and narrativist 
philosophers of  history as his point of  departure, he argues coherently against the 
tenets of  traditional historiography concerning the object of  historical studies, 
the practice of  historical research, and the results of  the scientific practices of  
historians. He proposes a threefold classification of  epistemological approaches 
which should be applicable everywhere where the European model of  history 
writing functions in an institutionalized form. In Munslow’s view, each and 
every historian follows either the reconstructionist, constructionist, or deconstructionist 
approach to the study of  the past and the writing of  history.
Like any classification or typology, Munslow’s has been subjected to various 
critical assessments. Munslow’s classification does indeed have weak points. 
However, the gravity of  these weaknesses depends on the perspective from 
which we approach his typology of  historiographical epistemologies and the 
purposes to which we wish to use it. Several authors, approaching it from the 
perspective of  the philosophy of  history, ontology, and epistemology, have 
expressed objections. I will briefly mention one of  them. These objections 
concern definitional problems with the category of  constructionism, and they in no 
way belittle Munslow’s work. They merely amend it.
However, Munslow aspires to do more than merely contribute to the 
philosophy of  history. His main goal is to promote the deconstructionist approach 
3  Munslow, Deconstructing History; idem, The Routledge Companion; idem, The New History; Jenkins and 
Munslow, The Nature of  History.
HHR_2017-4_KÖNYV.indb   777 1/9/2018   3:32:39 PM
778
Hungarian Historical Review 6,  no. 4  (2017): 776–803
to pursuing research on the past and the writing of  history. The reconstructionist/
constructionist epistemology in his view has fundamental problems. Historians 
falling into these categories are, according to Munslow, living in an illusion 
according to which they (and historiography in general) are producing truthful 
scholarly knowledge. Munslow (and he is far from being alone) thinks that the 
writers of  history and history writing in general need to disabuse themselves of  
this delusion.4 Thus, his threefold classification is meant to be more than a mere 
disinterested taxonomy; it is supposed to be used as an analytical tool to help 
achieve this goal. From this perspective, I think his classification suffers from 
several deficiencies and omissions which are much weightier. Though I agree 
with major parts of  his reasoning, I am skeptical about the analytical strength 
and potential of  his threefold classification. The first weak point in this respect is 
the same as the shortcoming mentioned above: the category of  constructionism 
is based on mistaken definitional premises. Moreover, to speak only about 
constructionism is an oversimplification. One can conceptualize at least two ideal-
typical versions of  constructionism, both on epistemological and on practical 
bases. The second weak point is that Munslow uses a rather narrow conception 
of  epistemology. He makes the central reference point of  his classification the 
question of  the ontic status of  the past and historians’ presumed belief  in or 
skepticism concerning its objective form.
From philosophical point of  view, this might be legitimate and 
unobjectionable, but if  the goal is to study and understand the professional 
(scholarly) history writing in its complexity, some other aspects need to be 
taken into consideration. For instance, Munslow’s classification cannot explain 
why there are within one discipline such diverse and completely contradictory 
epistemologies—a rather unique occurrence even within the humanities, 
let alone the social sciences. Nor can it explain the seemingly paradoxical 
continued domination of  (in Munslow’s view) two fallacious epistemologies: 
the reconstructionist and the constructionist. And particularly, it fails to 
explain why reconstructionism, the most obsolete of  the three epistemological 
positions, did not vanish after many decades of  intense and plausible criticism 
4  It has been half  a century since Hayden White gave historians the following warning in one of  his 
famous early studies: “[One] must be prepared to entertain the notion that history, as currently conceived, 
is a kind of  historical accident, a product of  a specific historical situation, and that, with the passing of  
the misunderstandings that produced that situation, history itself  may lose its status as an autonomous and 
self-authenticating mode of  thought.” White, “The Burden of  History,” 29. Reader edited by Keith Jenkins 
offers a useful overview of  similar positions: Jenkins, The Postmodern History.
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coming not only from philosophers of  history, but also from historians 
themselves.
In the case of  the humanities and particularly historiography, the social 
purpose of  the knowledge produced by scholars and the interaction between 
scholars and the public have a decisive formative influence on both the theory and 
the practice of  the discipline. The purpose and social functioning of  historical 
knowledge is thus an aspect that must be incorporated into the epistemological 
studies of  history and historiography. Munslow’s classification is useful because, 
even if  with some flaws, it comprehensively identifies what we are dealing with 
when we speak about the fundamentals of  history writing in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. Munslow reveals the problems and offers remedies, but he 
is not paying adequate attention to the question “why?” Munslow’s classification 
fails to offer any explanation (nor does it attempt to offer any explanation) of  
why the “problematic epistemology” (i.e. reconstructionism) remains dominant, 
despite decades of  persuasive critiques of  the premises on which it rests. Thus, 
it remains little more than an inspiring but imaginative and exceedingly ideal-
typical typology with a rather limited potential as an instrument in the analyses 
of  historiographical practice past and present.
The most elementary question of  the epistemology of  history is ontological: 
What is the object of  historical study and how does it exist? If  the object of  
historians’ interest is the “past,” or, more specifically, “the connections between 
events and human intention or agency in the past,” how does this past exist 
in the present?5 There is a consensus that the “past” (what happened “before 
now”) is non-existent in any present, however, there are material remnants in 
the form of  sources. This consensus, nevertheless, begins to show fissures when 
the following questions are raised: is the past in any way objectively structured? 
Are historians really studying the “past,” or are they “merely” studying people’s 
ideas about what happened? What about chronological ordering, historical 
fact, and historical event? Are these natural “building blocks” of  the “past,” 
i.e. manifestations through which one can shed light on its otherwise hidden 
structuring? Or they are rather the constructs of  historians? Are the sources 
repositories of  truth about the past? Is there an objective, i.e. observer-
independent truth which can be discovered by historians and told (narrated) 
to others? Is there a direct correspondence between the events of  the past and 
the narratives (i.e. history) about them? Is the language used by historians a 
5  Munslow, Deconstructing History, 4.
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transparent tool for conveying information, or does it have a formative influence, 
whether historians are conscious of  it or not? Does the way the narrative is told 
have any formative impact on its meaning? Does the subjectivity of  historians 
(the social, cultural, educational, and psychological determinants) influence their 
narratives of  the past? If  so, is it possible (or necessary, or desirable) to eliminate 
or at least regulate these determinants and influences?
These are some of  the questions that have preoccupied philosophers of  
history over the course of  the past half-century. The answers historians have 
given to these questions place them into one of  Munslow’s three categories 
(or genres) of  history writing. In the following, I will offer a brief  outline of  
Munslow’s threefold classification and some of  his main points.
Reconstructionist historians presume (usually implicitly) that what happened 
in the past had a given form which is discoverable and can be truthfully 
represented through narratives. In principle, if  the conditions are right (i.e. if  
there are sufficient sources and the researchers are skilled and adequately trained), 
historians should be able to uncover and reconstruct the course of  events and 
narrate them objectively “as they actually happened.” Munslow characterizes the 
reconstructionists as hard-core empiricists and (naïve) realists. The former means 
that reconstructionist historians consider the sources remnants and specimens 
of  the past which contain self-evident facts about the past. Historians merely 
use their talents and abilities to extract and process these facts, putting them into 
the correct order and thus arriving at a disinterested and truthful interpretation 
of  what actually happened. The absolute primacy of  the study of  sources is 
informed by a realist vision of  the past: “Realists … [are saying that] … the 
past must exist regardless of  whether there are any historians just as mountains 
exist regardless of  whether there are mountaineers or geographers.”6 In other 
words, reconstructionist historians, whether consciously or unconsciously, are 
objectifying/reifying the “past.” They tend to think about “historical events” 
as if  they were objective entities, unique and fixed, observable and describable. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that reconstructionists endorse a concept 
of  truth that is congruent with the correspondence theories of  truth, meaning, 
and knowledge. Reconstructionist historians also look with suspicion on 
interdisciplinary imports into the workings of  historiography. Social theories 
used in historical research are viewed as deviations which artificially try to force 
“structures,” “regularities,” or “laws” upon the past. The use of  theories leads to 
6  Munslow, The New History, 9.
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violation of  the past “reality,” deformations of  heuristics and interpretation, and 
eventually the ideologization of  history.7
Theory, or no theory? The answer given to this question is what differentiates 
the constructionist historians from reconstructionist historians the most. 
According to constructionists, human acts and behavior in the past are too 
complex to be interpreted correctly without a proper conceptual apparatus and 
theoretical background. The Annalistes, the Marxist/neo-Marxist schools, and the 
various schools inspired by theories of  modernization are, according to Munslow, 
constructionists.8 Constructionist historians, in contrast with reconstructionists, 
do not endorse the correspondence theory a-critically: “Constructionists 
generally are aware that their narratives do not automatically mirror the reality 
of  the past and that objectivity (at least as understood by reconstructionists) 
is impossible.”9 Yet, there is a crucial point on which constructionists are in 
agreement with their reconstructionist “cousins,” as Munslow labels them,10 
and that is the belief  in the objectivity of  the past. In other words, even if  
constructionists admit that we might never know “wie es eigentlich gewesen,” 
they insist there is one ultimate truth about the past. According to Munslow 
constructionists believe in the existence of  objective structures and patterns 
which can be studied and revealed with the help of  social theories and models. 
This very much reminds one of  the reconstructionist objectification/reification 
of  the “historical facts” and “historical events.” Similarly, the constructionist 
understanding of  the ontology and epistemic value of  the sources resembles 
the reconstructionist views. In fact, Munslow often treats both categories as 
fundamentally one: “reconstructionist/constructionist.”11
Deconstructionists pay much more attention to the person of  the historian 
and the factors which determine him/her. There is no inherent meaning hidden 
in the sources, nor is there a truth about the past. Historians do not observe and 
reconstruct the events of  the past. On the contrary, they construct narratives 
about events or aspects of  events which took place in the past. The writing 
7  Munslow, Deconstructing History, 39–60.
8  Munslow categorizes several well-known historians (sociologist-historians and anthropologist-
historians) as constructionists: Norbert Elias, Robert Darnton, Marshal Sahlins, Perry Anderson, E. P. 
Thompson, and even Anthony Giddens. Munslow, Deconstructing History, 21. For exemplification of  
reconstructionist, constructionist, and deconstructionist historians see also Jenkins and Munslow, The 
Nature of  History Reader.
9  Munslow, The New History, 15.
10  Idem, Deconstructing History, 25; idem, The New History, 6.
11  Idem, Deconstructing History, 39–60.
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of  history is essentially a process of  literary representation, not an unbiased 
objective description of  how things actually happened. This does not mean that 
the deconstructionists would deny that there is information in the sources. The 
deconstructionist “argument is that knowing what happened does not tell you 
what it means.”12 And it is in the process of  giving meaning, i.e. representing, that 
the subjective, contingent, ideological, and fictive elements enter the narrative of  
history. “The point of  deconstructionist history is the challenge it throws down 
to the idea, which reaches its ultimate expression in hard-core constructionism, 
especially of  the statistical variety, that there are essential (true) patterns ‘out 
there’ to be discovered in the past.”13 According to this view, the past can be best 
understood as an inherently meaningless unbounded heterogeneous stream of  
happening within which human action unfolded.
The historical facts are far from having an inherent true meaning decipherable 
on the basis of  the sources. Nor are “historical events” the natural constituents 
of  the past, as the reconstructionists and partly constructionists prefer to see 
them. Both facts and events are constructions, parts of  the history discourse, not 
real and observer-independent entities. However, the most significant argument 
of  deconstructionists and the one that is still provoking bitter responses from 
practicing historians concerns the language and the form in which history is 
represented. With the exception of  very traditional reconstructionists, most of  
the actors in the discipline to some extent acknowledge the subjectivity (i.e. bias 
stemming from social, cultural, ideological, and other determinations) of  the 
historian as a formative factor in the writing of  history. The deconstructionists 
go further in their claim that, in addition to the preconceptions, prejudices, and 
biases as influences which can never be entirely eliminated, the language and the 
particular rhetorical mode predominantly used by historians to represent the past 
(the narrative) exerts its own influence on the meanings of  these representations, 
an influence which is beyond the control of  historians. At this point Munslow, 
draws heavily on the works of  philosophers of  history Hayden White, Frank 
Ankersmit, Hans Kellner, Jörn Rüsen, Keith Jenkins, Louis Mink, Paul Ricoeur, 
and their followers. The way in which historians arrange the facts and thus create 
an emplotment for the story (the historical representation) bestows the narrative 
with meanings at a very fundamental level. According to Hayden White there 
12  Ibid., Deconstructing History, 83.
13  Munslow, Deconstructing History, 70.
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are four elementary kinds of  emplotment: romantic, comic, tragic, and satiric.14 
Thus, the histories written by historians are, as far as the form of  the narrative is 
concerned, either romance, comedy, tragedy, or satire. In theory, every past event 
can be emploted (narrated) in each of  the four ways. The question of  which 
is used is most often not the conscious choice of  the historian, but rather the 
outcome of  other discursive determinants.15 
This is one of  the strongest arguments of  the deconstructionists in favor 
of  the relativist, non-objectivist, non-empiricist epistemology of  history, yet it 
is also one of  the most misunderstood and ignored by historians. The human 
act is in itself  valueless. It is neither tragic nor comic. It can be viewed as such 
only from a certain perspective. Every historian speaking about past events 
is doing so from a particular position which is determined and influenced 
by many discursive and non-discursive factors.16 The truthfulness of  various 
interpretations is relative to the “regimes of  truth” within which they come into 
being. Thus, it is not merely correspondence with the facts in the first place that 
serves as the basis for deciding whether a narrative is true, but the ideological 
background, preconceptions, and, as I will argue, the purpose the narrative of  
history is intended to serve.
In his Deconstructing History (first published in 1997), Munslow did not offer 
any concrete examples of  deconstructionist historical writings. He did so seven 
years later in the reader The Nature of  History, which he co-edited with Keith 
Jenkins.17 There are excerpts from the works of  ten authors. Two selections are 
from the writings of  philosophers (Hayden White and Jacques Derrida), while 
the remaining eight examples (from works by Greg Dening, Walter Benjamin, 
Richard Price, Robert A. Rosenstone, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Sven Lindquist, 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Iain Chambers) differ in style and form, but they 
are similar in the conspicuous absence of  fluent linear narrative (this does not 
mean, however, that they are non-narrative) and stylistic experimentation. As 
the editors put it, the chosen excerpts are “texts which undercut the idea of  the 
14  White, Metahistory. The narrativist argument was further developed (partially independently, partially 
following White) by other authors as well, most notably Paul Ricoeur, Hans Kellner, and Frank Ankersmit.
15  In White’s view, the mode of  emplotment the form of  the historians’ explanation (formist, organicist, 
mechanistic, and contextualist), and the ideological dimension of  a historical account (anarchist, conservative, 
radical, and liberal) are predetermined by the tropological prefiguration of  the text (metaphor, metonymy, 
synecdoche, and irony). White, Metahistory, 7–38. For an accessible introduction into White’s thinking see 
Paul, Hayden White.
16  Munslow, Deconstructing History, 61–81.
17  Jenkins and Munslow, The Nature of  History, 115–239.
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narrator as nobody and stress the author’s creative role. Dispensing with linear 
narratives in favor of  multi-voiced, multi-perspectival, multi-levelled, fragmented 
arrangements… [these authors play] …with the possibility of  creating new ways 
of  representing and figuring ‘the before now’.”18
Obviously, Munslow’s “reconstructionists,” “constructionists,” and 
“deconstructionists” should be perceived as ideal-typical categories. As such, 
they are utopias, and they can hardly be found in their pristine form in reality.19 
Nevertheless, if  ideal types are to be properly operable in the work of  analyses, 
they need to be plausibly constructed. In the following, I argue that Munslow 
makes several assumptions which render his threefold classification problematic, 
especially for analytical use in the study of  historiographical practice. I draw 
attention to some of  the weak points of  Munslow’s definitional approach, and 
I then suggest a redefinition and split of  his category of  constructionism into 
two subcategories.
Munslow places considerable emphasis on the ontic status of  the past as 
perceived by historians, making it a sort of  primary epistemological reference 
point of  his classification. This is his most decisive criterion, through which 
he defines the two opposing camps: reconstructionist/constructionist vs. 
deconstructionist. At the same time, he downplays the importance of  other 
factors and categorical attributes (such as research practice, methods, and 
approaches), reducing them to mere secondary features. For Munslow, the 
methods of  research and the ways of  acquiring knowledge serve merely as 
secondary “markers” with which to identify the primary epistemological feature. 
This is particularly noticeable in his definition of  constructionism. Munslow 
simply assumes that historians working with theories and concepts from the 
social sciences believe in the objective past, much as reconstructionists do. The 
18  Ibid., 115. Despite what has been said, the narrative form is dominantly present in the cited writings 
of  the authors listed above. The use of  figurative language, the tendency to quote primary (i.e. archival, 
iconographical etc.) sources, and the relative lack of  systematic analyses resembling analyses in the social 
sciences make them appear at first sight closer to the reconstructionist “style” as characterized by Munslow. 
On the other hand, most of  the authors characterized in Jenkins and Munslow’s reader as deconstructionist 
are evidently well-acquainted with critical social and culture theories and accept works by social theorists 
and consider constructionist historians as plausible (quotable) sources of  knowledge, which draws them 
much closer to the constructionist “camp” (e.g. compare with the articles and books by Greg Dening, 
Richard Price, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Sven Lindqvist, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Iain Chambers cited in 
the reader; Jenkins and Munslow, The Nature of  History, 117–34, 142–55, 171–81, 182–90, 191–97, 214–24 
respectively).
19  I borrow the designation of  ideal-types as utopias from the creator of  the concept himself; see Weber, 
“‘Objectivity’ in Social Science,” 90.
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only easily identifiable attribute that distinguishes Munslow’s constructionists 
from the reconstructionists is the former’s use of  social theories. At the same 
time, the principal feature which differentiates the constructionists from the 
deconstructionists is the constructionists’ alleged belief  in the existence of  
objective (i.e. discoverable) social, economic, cultural, political, etc. patterns in 
the past.
For Munslow, the fact that someone conceptualizes of  him or herself  as 
a social historian who works with sociological, anthropological, psychological, 
and other theories to gain knowledge about various aspects of  human life in 
the past, simply in itself  serves as a decisive defining marker of  the historian’s 
epistemological/ontological belief  about the nature of  the past and its 
knowability. The definitional tying together of  these features, making one the 
indicator of  the other, is aprioristic and exceedingly reductionist.
Another problematic aspect of  Munslow’s strict classificatory approach 
concerns the manner in which he singles out and overemphasizes a narrowly 
defined criterion. Historians’ ideas regarding the ontic status of  the past 
(past events, social phenomena etc.) often cannot be conclusively identified. 
Undoubtedly there are cases in which an author’s epistemological position can be 
safely inferred from his/her textual output. But in many cases, unless a historian 
makes an explicit statement about his/her standing as far as the knowability of  
past events is concerned, an inference will remain just a guess. Thus, it is not at 
all surprising that most of  the authors whose writings Munslow (and Jenkins) 
uses as examples of  reconstructionist, constructionist, and deconstructionist 
historical accounts made their epistemological stance explicitly clear either in 
the texts quoted or somewhere else.20 Only few practicing historians make an 
explicit statement about their epistemological points of  departure, particularly 
concerning the very issues Munslow make a decisive definitional factor. The 
search for answers to such elementary ontological/epistemological questions still 
does not belong to the mainstream theoretical and methodological principles of  
the discipline. Most practicing historians do not consider raising and answering 
these questions a necessary prerequisite of  good historical scholarship.
One might therefore have doubts about the general validity of  Munslow’s 
three epistemological positions (genres), since their construction is based on 
limited and specific empirical material: the writings of  historians who, by the 
very virtue of  the fact that they have made their claims about the ontic status of  
20  See the reader Jenkins and Munslow, The Nature of  History.
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the past and its knowability explicit, represent a rather rare kind. One might ask 
whether the validity of  Munslow’s threefold classification isn’t indeed limited to 
the historians whose writings he analyzes. Though in the same breath I must add 
that my skepticism does not go that far.
Arguably it is safe to presume that most of  the traditional style historical 
accounts which indeed are narrative (or at least largely narrative) and which deal 
with national histories, important figures of  national history, and so on can be 
safely categorized as reconstructionist. The same cannot be said, however, about 
the histories which are informed by social theories, even if  they are partly or 
even in large part narrative. For Munslow, such histories are constructionist and 
thus based on objectivist epistemological premises, very much like the histories 
of  reconstructionists. But many historians who fit into Munslow’s category of  
constructionism simply because they use social theory, adopt with the theoretical 
body they borrow from sociologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, 
and colleagues from other disciplines, very strong social constructivist 
epistemological propositions which are in stark opposition to naïve realism and 
acritical empiricism of  the sort that Munslow ascribes to reconstructionists 
and constructionists. Philosopher of  history Eugen Zeleňák makes a similar 
point and proposes an elegant solution to the contradictions stemming from 
Munslow’s rigorous definitional approach.
Zeleňák21 considers Munslow’s a priori judgement about constructionism 
as “essentially a subspecies of  reconstructionism”22 untenable, since he 
finds it difficult to justify such a close association of  constructionists who 
use social scientific concepts, theories, and hypotheses with a-theoretical 
reconstructionism. He points out that many historians working with critical 
social theories and an analytical conceptual apparatus are aware that they 
are working with constructions which are not derived from the past but, on 
the contrary, are applied to (or in Munslow’s words, imposed on) the evidence.23 
Following Munslow’s own argumentation and examples, Zeleňák suggests that 
Munslow is in fact speaking about at least two types of  constructionism, one 
which indeed is close to reconstructionism (constructionism-I) and another 
which is much closer to the deconstructionist ideas about the ontic status of  
the past and the possibilities of  knowing about the past (constructionism-
21  Zeleňák, “Modifying.”
22  Munslow, Deconstructing History, 24.
23  Zeleňák, “Modifying,” 529.
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II).24 Were the classification strictly based on general epistemological and 
ontological assumptions, Zeleňák claims, it would be more adequate to reduce 
the three categories to two basic epistemological types which he labels direct 
realism and impositionalism. Reconstructionists and constructionists-I are direct 
realists, since their epistemological fundaments are based on the idea that they 
are discovering the objective (i.e. observer independent) knowledge about past 
events. Deconstructionists and constructionists-II are impositionalists because they 
deliberately and, in accordance with the rules of  scholarly conduct, impose 
concepts, theories and models on the information about past happenings which 
they are able to derive from sources, thus creating knowledge about particular 
aspects of  past phenomena. Impositionalists do not consider this knowledge a 
mirror image of  past events “as they actually happened.” They are aware that 
what they write is in many ways contingent and dependent on perspective.25
Though Zeleňák’s reduced epistemological classification might seem too 
general, simplicity is its advantage. If  we keep the secondary “markers” of  
Munslow’s classification,26 strip it of  its unsubstantiated assumptive aprioristic 
ontological/epistemological primary definitional criteria, and replace it with 
Zeleňák’s basic twofold categorization, we get the skeleton of  a much more 
workable ideal-type classification.
Consequently, a readjustment of  Munslow’s classification in this vein must 
include a reassessment of  his category of  constructionism/constructionist 
historians. If  this category is to be salvaged as an analytical concept which also 
refers to the scholarly practices of  historians, it needs to be split into at least 
two types, as has been already suggested. Not every historian working with 
social scientific concepts and theories does so in a competent way. To infer the 
epistemic position of  a historian on the basis of  a simple presence of  sociological, 
psychological, etc. terminology or references and allusions to grand theories of  
social sciences in his/her writing would merely be another aprioristic mistake. In 
other words, some of  the historians who use social scientific terminology have 
not adequately mastered the theory itself, let alone the episteme upon which 
the given theory rests. I label this category of  historian constructionist-improper 
24  Ibid., 527–30. The labels constructionism I and constructionism II are mine. I introduce them here for the 
sake of  the clarity of  the later argumentation.
25  Ibid., 530–35.
26  These secondary markers are the following: (1.) the form (whether a historical writing is narrative, 
partially narrative, or non-narrative, descriptive, or analytical, etc.); and (2.) the research practice and 
methodology adopted by the authors (whether the historian’s interpretations are informed by social theory 
or are a-theoretical, etc.).
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historians. I will return to this category later. First, let us examine the second type 
of  constructionism, which I label constructionism-proper, in greater detail.
As already stated, constructionist-proper historians are full-fledged social 
constructivists. These historians usually recognize the difference between ontological 
and epistemological objectivity and the subjectivity of  facts and observations, and 
they are aware of  the constructed nature of  social reality and the specific ontic 
status of  social and institutional facts. They reject the Rankean “wie es eigentlich 
gewesen” kind of  (direct realist) creed and are aware that their accounts are but 
contingent representations constructed from a certain perspective. At the same 
time, however, this kind of  historian accepts the reality of  cause and effect, 
the reality of  human action and institutional agency, and the reality of  social 
relations in the past. These things may not exist now, but they existed once. And 
even if  it is nonsensical to think that there can be a “true reconstruction” of  
these events, this does not mean we cannot attain valid knowledge about social 
phenomena in the past by studying sources. In fact, accounts of  this kind by 
constructionist historians are not histories in the traditional sense anymore. It 
is more appropriate to look at them as forms of  historical sociology, historical 
anthropology, historical economy, historical political science, etc., as is reflected 
in the names of  some of  the historical schools and subdisciplines.
When I propose the adoption of  the term constructionist-improper historians 
to denote a category of  historians one of  whose defining features is a relative 
inability (in no way permanent or inherent) to work properly with social 
constructivist theories and to grasp fully the epistemic bases of  such theories, 
I do not mean to suggest any lack of  intellectual capacity. Historians themselves 
never independently developed theories of  social life that would become 
transdisciplinary because they never had to. Professional institutionalized 
scholarly history writing started in the nineteenth century as a discipline the 
primary function of  which was to “discover” and “describe” the past of  
“nations” and the deeds of  the great men, leaders, representatives of  nations, 
etc. It was not the goal of  historians to study psychological, social psychological, 
social, cultural, economic, political, or other general human-related phenomena. 
Thus, historiography did not manage to evolve into discipline that would inspire 
sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, etc. in their research strategies and 
agenda. It was, rather, the other way around. Some historians adopted or were 
inspired by concepts, theories, and methods used in other disciplines of  the 
humanities and social sciences. However, this process of  drawing inspiration from 
and/or adopting approaches, theories, concepts, and research strategies from 
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other disciplines never became a general feature of  historians’ training. Often, a 
historian develops an ability to work properly with theories and concepts from 
other disciplines only because of  his or her determination and study. In many 
cases, historians who accept (or have been socialized into) the constructionist 
idea according to which past human phenomena are too complex to be correctly 
interpreted without a proper conceptual apparatus and theoretical background 
are for various reasons not able to work properly with social theories.
Perhaps surprisingly, this phenomenon is not unique to historiography. In 
the early 2000s, sociologist Rogers Brubaker critically remarked that the social 
scientific discourse about ethnicity, race, nationalism, and identity is plagued 
with an “intellectual slackness” which he labels “complacent and clichéd 
constructivism.”27 The most characteristic feature of  clichéd constructivism is 
intuitive and superficial use of  complex concepts and theories (e.g. that of  “social 
identity”),28 which very often leads to serious fallacies, notably essentialism and 
reification. In historiography, in particular the concepts of  ethnicity, ethnic and 
national identity, ethnic group, nation and nationalism, race and racism, social 
group and collective action, and collective memory (to mention only a few) often 
fall prey to clichéd constructivism. Naturally, one can distinguish various degrees 
of  inadequate and uninformed use of  scholarly (social scientific) concepts, from 
the most vulgar, when historians blatantly essentialize for instance “ethnic” or 
“national identity” (i.e. either explicitly or implicitly they treat “identity” as an 
inherent feature of  a historical actor or entire aggregates of  the population) 
and/or reify social groups, categories, or classes (i.e. they endow them with 
ontological objectivity, speak about them as acting entities, and treat them as 
natural, not social, phenomena) to more sophisticated cases, when analyses which 
are informed by essentialist and reifying presumptions and misconceptions are 
concealed behind a constructivist rhetoric. I label this practice of  pretended 
constructivism “constructionism-improper.”29
27  Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups, 3 and 38. Ian Hacking voiced similar criticism of  the devaluation 
of  the concept of  social construction in his: Hacking, The Social Construction of  What?.
28  Brubaker, “Beyond ‘Identity’.”
29  Obviously even this split of  Munslow’s homogeneous category of  constructionism might seem 
insufficient. Several other subcategories could be delineated. For instance, there are historians whose use 
of  critical social theory concepts is not flawed, incompetent, or “clichéd,” but also is not consequential 
or thorough. To put it metaphorically, for various reasons these historians merely scratch the surface and 
do not fully realize the potential (at least from social scientific point of  view) of  their data, sources, and 
hypotheses in the context of  the theoretical background from which they depart or to which they refer. 
Certainly, a handful of  subcategories of  this sort could be (and as a result of  empirical research should be) 
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As I implied above, from an ontological/epistemological point of  view each 
of  the two categories of  constructionism suggested by me is congruent with 
Zeleňák’s dichotomy of  direct realism and impositionalism. Constructionist-
improper historians will probably though certainly not exclusively be direct 
realists, while constructionist-proper historians will probably be impositionalists.30
So far, I have argued that if  Munslow had merely typified various 
epistemological positions currently prevailing in historiography, his classification 
would count as (perhaps with some amendments, such as the one made by 
Zeleňák) a valuable contribution to the epistemology of  history. However, 
since Munslow’s ambition has been to propose a general classification of  the 
historiographical practice with special regard to elementary epistemological 
positions of  historians, he included and aprioristically tied together features 
such as the use of  theory in the works of  historical interpretation and methods 
of  research. I pointed to the problematic aspects of  this approach, and I 
deconstructed the category of  constructionism, splitting it into two ideal-type 
subcategories. Now I turn to the last question I have asked in the introduction 
of  this paper: why did the direct realist (reconstructionist/constructionist-
improper) epistemological position not vanish after many decades of  intense 
and justified criticism, and indeed why does it arguably remain, this criticism 
notwithstanding, the mainstream episteme within history writing globally?
Well-known historians from renowned schools such as the Annales, 
Begriffsgeschichte, the Cambridge school of  the history of  political ideas, 
Marxist/neo-Marxist schools in Great Britain, France and elsewhere, 
Microhistory, and New cultural history, to mention only a few, are perceived 
as the elite of  the discipline, at least within the European and transatlantic 
Anglophone historiographies. These historians are cited and referred to far more 
pinned down. I propose splitting Munslow’s original concept of  constructionism into “merely” two types 
(based not so much on Munslow’s primary epistemological/ontological criterion as on the methods of  
attaining knowledge) to make Munslow’s classification more concrete, yet at the same time general enough 
for broader analytical application.
30  Though here I would like to repeat the point I made earlier about the complexity of  determining 
the epistemological positions of  historians concerning the ontic status of  the “past” and “history.” 
There are cases in which even Zeleňák’s general dichotomy (direct realist vs. impositionalist) needs to be 
applied cautiously. Presumably, every historian departs, whether intuitively or consciously, from a certain 
epistemological/ontological position, but this theoretical stance is not always identifiable beyond all doubt 
in his or her written or spoken output. In some cases, it is not possible to decide conclusively without further 
focused investigation (e.g. by interviewing the historian) whether the author believes in the objectivity of  
the “past” and the existence of  an ultimate truth about past events or not.
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frequently than most.31 Nevertheless, though they have existed for decades and 
have undergone a process of  progressive development, the schools represented 
by these historians (and some other schools) remain in the position of  an avant-
garde. The ways of  thinking and working adopted by these historians, i.e. their 
impositionalist epistemological points of  departure have not been incorporated 
into the discipline’s general theoretical and methodological framework, and this 
is also true of  their methods, theories, and the themes of  their research. Why 
have respected authors, whose scholarship and work is highly esteemed, petrified 
in the position of  a special elite sub-genre? Why did the constructionist-proper 
and deconstructionist approaches to research and history writing not become 
(or became only to a limited extent) integral parts of  the standard training of  
history students?
Obviously, there is no simple answer to these questions. Several closely 
related determinants—of  a cognitive, social-psychological and social, political, 
cultural (ideological), economic, and institutional nature—are at play. But 
factors such as the outdated history education system, structural peculiarities of  
personal reproduction within the academic sphere, lack of  resources, political/
ideological influence and limitations on freedom of  research etc. are secondary 
(not in importance, but in effect) to cognitive, social-psychological/social, 
and power-related (political/ideological) determinants, or to put it in other 
words, to the social functions and purposes of  professional history writing 
(historiography). I contend that we should start to look for new understandings 
of  and explanations for epistemic positions in historiography in the domain of  
the functionality of  historical knowledge in society.
So far, following Munslow’s threefold categorization, I have been paying 
attention to professional historians: their ideas about the past and its knowability, 
their scholarly practice, and the outcomes of  this practice in the form of  written 
histories. Now, we need to turn our attention to the consumers of  history, in 
particular the non-professional public. I believe it is relevant to ask why people 
need history, why it makes sense to read and remember history, why is important 
to teach histories in an institutionalized and controlled manner. In the following, 
I consider the functions of  history in modern societies. I argue that it is important 
31  At this point, I would like to emphasize that I am speaking strictly about the intra-disciplinary status 
of  the leading historians of  the schools listed. It is important to distinguish between the image of  influence 
based on scientometric data (which might have relevance in an intra-disciplinary context) and the actual 
social impact (which is very difficult to quantify in objective terms and for which the data provided by 
scientometrics has little or no relevance).
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to consider both the epistemological/ontological positions of  historians and 
the intuitive (pre-theoretical) epistemological/ontological assumptions of  lay 
readers, listeners, and viewers of  history when studying the practice of  history 
writing. Both the social purpose of  historiographies and to a considerable extent 
the practice of  the discipline as such is determined by the social functioning of  
the socially relevant narratives about the past, which is in turn largely determined 
by the cognitive modalities of  perception of  the “before now” by human beings, 
at least in modern societies.
There are many conceptualizations and typologies of  the functions of  
history in everyday social life. For instance, G. E. R. Lloyd identifies eleven 
aims or agendas which historians set for themselves: (1) entertainment, (2) 
memorializing or commemorating, (3) glorification/vilification or celebration/
denigration, (4) legitimization of  regimes, (5) justifying past actions and policies, 
(6) explaining why things happened as they did, (7) offering instruction on 
the basis of  past experience, (8) providing records for administrative use, (9) 
warning, admonishing on moral or prudential grounds, (10) criticizing others’ 
interpretations, and (11) “just” recording the past, saying how it was.32 John Tosh 
or Enrique Florescano propose similar lists of  the “uses” and social functions 
of  history.33
I reduce Lloyd’s points to three general functionalities.34
The first of  these is the Historia magistra vitae est function (which, I admit, is 
perhaps not the most fortunate label to use in this context). History, or more 
precisely, knowledge about some aspects of  past human phenomena serves as a 
source of  learning for present practical purposes. Niccolò Machiavelli’s Il Principe 
might be mentioned as one of  the early prototypical examples. Machiavelli referred 
to particular deeds and strategies of  past rulers, conquerors, commanders, and 
32  Lloyd, Disciplines in the Making, 60.
33  Tosh, “The Uses of  History,” 29–57; Florescano, “The Social Function of  History,” 41–49; 
Florescano, La función social de la historia.
Also see older but still relevant studies by Hobsbawm, “The Social Function of  the Past”; Mommsen, “Social 
Conditioning”; Schieder, “The Role of  Historical Consciousness”; Faber, “The Use of  History”; Finley, 
The Use and Abuse of  History. Also see an inspiring article by A. Dirk Moses on the possible implications of  
Hayden White’s views on the purpose of  history for the study of  nationalist conflicts and the utilization of  
history in them. Moses, “Hayden White.”
34  I have no ambition to propose an exhausting overview of  the public uses of  history. I omit some 
of  Lloyd’s points—particularly (8), (10), and (11) —that primarily do not refer to the social functions of  
knowledge about the past. Also, given the spatial limitations of  this inquiry, I am not paying particular 
attention to phenomena like “public history,” “living history,” or history reenactments, which, however, can 
be considered via the three general categories of  history’s social functionality that I am proposing.
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politicians to provide examples in support of  his own observations regarding the 
nature of  domination and power. Machiavelli’s approach was purely utilitarian; 
he analyzed past events and actors (causes and factors) in order to suggest the 
best course of  action or a strategy for the present and future. On the other 
end of  the spectrum are the modern scholarly works, which study past social, 
political, economic, etc. phenomena in order to gain critical knowledge for a 
better understanding of  present processes and developments. Very often, these 
kinds of  historical accounts are also intended to serve as an admonishment or 
warning. Not surprisingly, this tendency is most apparent in the contemporary 
history writings dealing with non-democratic regimes, power and domination, 
stereotyping and discrimination, war and genocide, crisis and collapses, etc. 
However, any kind of  practical learning from accounts of  past events and the 
deeds of  historical actors fit under this deliberately broadly defined category, 
including learning about ethics and morality, social norms, etc.
The second general functionality is the legitimizing function. When speaking 
about legitimization through history, most informed people think first and 
foremost of  political ideologies and the historiographies of  non-democratic 
regimes in the first place. Marxist-Leninist, national socialist, fascist, or traditional 
nationalist historiographies are but the overtly explicit forms of  history writing 
with the purpose of  legitimizing. A great deal has been written about the 
entanglement of  historiographies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
(and even in earlier periods) with ideologies, regimes, and social and political 
movements.35 However, legitimization is not necessarily (even if  it is frequently) 
ideological in the traditional political sense of  the word. There are much subtler 
forms through which historical accounts legitimize or delegitimize ideas, ways 
of  thinking and living, political regimes, economic systems, policies, reforms, 
wars, borders, claims for individual or collective rights, claims for territories, 
and so on.36 Theological modes of  narration, reification of  social concepts and 
35  Berger and Lorenz, Nationalizing the Past; Berger, Writing the Nation; Ferro, The Use and Abuse of  History; 
Davison, The use and Abuse of  Australian History; for premodern periods see an inspiring volume Hen and 
Innes, The Uses of  the Past; and Ianziti, Writing History in Renaissance Italy. Recent social psychological research 
also offers crucial insights into this functionality of  discourses on the past. See a very useful introductory 
study to the thematic issue of  the journal Culture & Psychology by de Saint-Laurent et al., “Collective Memory 
and Social Sciences”; Obradović, “Whose Memory and Why.”
36  I am referring to Hayden White’s concept of  the “ideological implication” of  historical narratives 
White, Metahistory, 5–7, 22–29, passim. For a lucid overview introducing the wider context of  White’s 
thinking concerning ideology and history see Paul, Hayden White, 22–24, 69–74, 116–127. Also see Stråth, 
“Ideology and History.”
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categories, essentialist social stereotypes and naïve theories about motivations 
and conditions, common sense assertions concerning necessity, inevitability, the 
beneficial or deleterious effects of  an act, an event, or an actor or groups or entire 
categories and aggregates of  population (to mention just a few) are semantic 
constituents which serve in historical narratives as vehicles of  justificatory and 
legitimizing meanings.
The third functionality is the anchoring function. Most people, including 
historians, have a tendency to “anchor” themselves in (identify with) historical 
narratives (usually reduced to simplified stories or bits of  stories) about 
referential groups of  which they consider themselves members. Obviously, 
most often the historicized referential group is a “nation” or “ethnic” or “racial” 
group. However, this should be considered a universal cognitive phenomenon 
that forms an important part of  the process of  an individual’s practices of  
identification with social or categorical groups in general.37 This social function 
of  history was heavily institutionalized in the second half  of  the nineteenth 
century and throughout the twentieth, and it became an important factor in the 
processes of  secondary socialization. Most of  the fallacies and misconceptions 
(which the constructionist-proper and deconstructionist historians try so hard to 
deconstruct) occur in writings which serve this function, whether intentionally 
or not.
The legitimizing and anchoring functionalities of  history (knowledge about 
past) seem to be indispensable and permanently present in social life. Both 
functions are best viewed as epiphenomena of  the political and social organization 
of  modern societies. Studies on collective memory and remembrance and 
studies on the politics of  memory deal primarily with these two social functions 
of  history.
An important specification needs to be added concerning the three point 
typology of  social functionality of  history proposed above. Not all the writings 
of  historians and probably not even the majority of  them actually function in the 
sphere of  social life in one or more of  the above outlined ways. There are history 
studies and books which will probably never have a readership larger than a few 
dozen or perhaps a few hundred readers. And there are studies and even books 
37  Indeed, not only social groups but any social entities in the most general meaning of  the word 
(i.e. also communities, towns and cities, institutions, and organizations, including firms and companies). 
Histories of  towns, companies etc., are often not written by historians out of  scholarly interest, but rather 
in response to an initiative or a call issued by the representatives of  the “entity” which desires “a history” as 
an indispensable part of  its “identity.” Linde, Working the Past; also see Zerubavel, Time Maps.
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that most probably will be read exclusively by fellow scholars. Several factors 
determine what kinds of  histories and historians will reach a larger public. Formal 
criteria are obvious: an accessible narrative form and socially relevant or in some 
other way appealing topic are probably necessary attributes of  a text if  it is going 
to reach a wider readership and audience. Other factors (closely related to the 
aforementioned) include institutional backing and market determinants. There 
is, however, another indispensable precondition to the writing of  a historian ever 
reaching a large readership: in order to reach “the masses,” a history (whether 
in form of  written text or vocal or visual performance or artifact) must be 
at least on a basic level compatible with the epistemological and ontological 
preconceptions of  (non-professional) consumers.
In the Introduction to his The New History (2003), Munslow remarks that it 
is widely assumed that the reconstructionist direct realist epistemology is in fact 
congruent with the “common sense” approach to understandings of  reality: 
“it is seen in the popular imagination as the only way to re-animate the past 
and, therefore, know what it means.”38 However, Munslow is dismissive of  this 
idea. In his view, there is nothing natural or inevitable in the realist-empiricist 
epistemology. He might be right; nevertheless there seems to be strong evidence 
suggesting that, at least in Western cultures, people’s thinking about the past is 
naïvely realist, acritically empiricist, and formally narrative.39 Individual memory 
and remembering and the processes of  construction, reconstruction, and 
maintenance of  biographical self-narratives are based on an objectifying/reifying 
realist perception of  past: “Memories may be the result of  many retranscriptions 
over time, but at any given time the rememberer typically experiences them 
as unproblematic structures or as facts, and as external to the rememberer.”40 
Individuals acquire and process semantic memories (or “reported events,” of  
which histories are a form) through the same cognitive operations and following 
38  Munslow, The New History, 5.
39  On the narrative structure of  autobiographical and narrative (i.e. collective) memory and the cognitive 
and cultural aspects of  their construction see Brunner, “Life as Narrative”; Fentress and Wickham, Social 
Memory, 51–75 and 87–143; Nelson, “Narrative and Self, Myth and Memory”, 3–28; McAdams, “Identity 
and the Life Story”; Fleisher Feldman, “Narratives of  National Identity”; also see the recent research by de 
Saint-Laurent, “Personal Trajectories, Collective Memories.”
40  Quote from Prager, Presenting the Past, 215; for further elaboration of  this point also see King, Memory, 
Narrative, Identity, 2–7 and Chapters 1 and 2; and Gergen, “Mind, Text, and Society.”
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the same epistemological and ontological presumptions through which they 
acquire and process episodic memories (or “experienced events”).41
Indeed, what Munslow calls hard-core realism-empiricism (i.e. a position 
characteristic of  reconstructionist historians) is in my understanding nothing 
but an intuitive commonsense approach to thinking about “before now.” Thus, 
put in a somewhat simplified manner, probably most future historians begin 
their study of  history at a university as direct realists (reconstructionists). They 
bring to their studies an intuitive commonsense “epistemology.” Whether 
in their future careers they tend towards an impositionalist position and 
became constructionists-proper or deconstructionist historians or remain 
reconstructionists or constructionists-improper depends on many factors.
At this point, we need to keep in mind that cognitive fallacies and specifically 
cognitive fallacies typical of  the reconstructionist and constructionist-improper 
type of  history writing are indispensable features of  everyday social practice. It is 
a well-documented phenomenon that the human mind has an intuitive capacity 
to reify (i.e. objectify) particular (socially important) abstractions, social relations, 
and institutions. Nations, races, classes, religious denominations, and other 
categorically defined aggregates of  people are among the most reified social 
entities. In the realm of  the scholarly (social scientific) production of  knowledge, 
reification and other cognitive modalities of  dealing with the complexities of  
human societies and everyday social practice, such as essentialism, stereotyping, 
and entitativism, are regarded as serious mistakes and methodological failures. 
However, as cognitive and social psychological research suggests, these cognitive 
biases are practically inevitable in and indispensable to everyday social practice.42
The idea of  nation as a deep historical egalitarian community of  shared 
language, territory, customs, and culture and of  a common fate would be 
impossible without the capacity for essentialist and reifying thought. A reifying 
concept of  nation as an objective historical entity, an essentialist concept of  
nationality/ethnicity/race, and what Munslow calls a hard-core empiricist-realist 
41  There are differences in how well this information is remembered and operationalized in social life. 
Larsen, “Remembering without Experiencing”; Neisser, “What is Ordinary Memory the Memory of?”
42  For basic information about reification see Fenichel Pitkin, “Rethinking Reification”; also see the 
classic Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of  Reality, 88–92. On essentialism see: Gelman, The 
Essential Child; Gelman, Coley and Gottfried, “Essentialist Beliefs in Children”; Hirschfeld, Race in the 
Making.
On stereotyping and entitativity see: Lickel et al., “Varieties of  Groups”; Yzerbyt, Corneille and Estrada, 
“The Interplay of  Subjective Essentialism and Entitativity”; Crump et al. “Group Entitativity and 
Similarity”; Sherman and Percy, “The Psychology of  Collective Responsibility.”
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vision of  the past and history are all necessary components of  national histories 
which enable them to function effectively and “naturally” as referential frames 
of  self-identification. In other words, both cognitive fallacy and the propensity 
to think about the past in the same way (in the same terms and categories) as the 
present are necessary to bring about a sense of  the fundamental realness of  the 
historically represented past.
Constructionist-proper historians design their methodological measures and 
adopt critical social theories to eliminate reifying and essentialist conceptions 
and stereotypical notions and naïve theories from their history writing. In other 
words, they deconstruct the cognitive fallacies that are indispensable to the 
legitimizing and anchoring functionality of  history. This renders the writings 
of  many impositionalist historians difficult to read and understand to the non-
professional or uninformed consumer of  history. Constructionist-proper and 
deconstructionist historiographies are (unlike reconstructionist history writing) 
quite counterintuitive, and they require prior familiarity with philosophical and 
social scientific theoretical knowledge if  one seeks to understand them fully. 
This usually also means that the histories written by constructionist-proper 
and deconstructionist historians operate outside and even in opposition to 
the historical discourses that fulfil (or at least have the potential to fulfil) the 
legitimization and anchoring functions of  history.43 Reconstructionist and to 
a varying extent inadvertently also constructionist-improper historians serve a 
purpose that constructionist-proper and deconstructionist historians cannot.44
In this paper, I have argued that Munslow’s threefold classification suffers 
from a priori presumptions about the elementary ontological/epistemological 
positions of  historians. This is most evident in his category of  constructionism. 
Munslow defines each of  his three historical epistemologies or genres very 
narrowly on the basis of  historians’ alleged beliefs about the ontic nature of  
43  It is not hard to see the correlations between the functionalities outlined above and the epistemological 
positions of  historians. Presumably, the legitimizing and anchoring function is dominantly fulfilled 
by the output of  reconstructionist/constructionist-improper historians. The constructionist-proper/
deconstructionist histories dominantly fit into the category of  Historia magistra vitae est functionality of  
history.
44  For instance the monumental Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (vols. 1–8, 1972–1997) by Otto Brunner, 
Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck and their colleagues, like Quentin Skinner’s Liberty before Liberalism (1998), 
Lynn Hunt’s Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (1984), or the classic by Eugene Weber, Peasants 
into Frenchmen (1977), not only do not offer legitimizing or identification narratives, but on the contrary 
analyze the contingent nature of  social concepts and categories, the functionings of  power, identity politics 
and construction of  identity discourses, and legitimizing discourses.
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the “before now” and its knowability. He proposes several secondary criteria 
(most notably the use of  critical social theories by constructionist historians) 
that would indicate the belonging of  a historical text and its author to one of  
the three epistemological types. I argue for a looser association of  formal and 
methodological criteria with basic ontological/epistemological positions of  
historians. Furthermore, I argue for a more flexible approach to defining those 
positions, in which respect I find the solution proposed by Eugen Zeleňák (two 
rather general categories: direct realism vs. impositionalism) more workable.
It is necessary to differentiate between historians whose accounts are almost 
entirely narrative or partially narrative and analytic or entirely non-narrative 
or narrative, but in an atypical, experimental way; between historians whose 
interpretations are a-theoretical and historians who use social theories. However, 
it is also important to draw distinctions between the ways in which historians 
operate with theories. The depth to which historians acquaint themselves with 
social theories (and their epistemic background) and the degree of  adequate 
operationalization of  theoretical and conceptual apparatuses in the writing 
of  history are, in my assessment, relatively robust epistemological definitional 
criteria that cannot be ignored. Following this line of  reasoning, I propose 
split Munslow’s category of  constructionism into two types. Constructionism-
improper is characterized by an inadequate mastering of  theories and 
the “contamination” of  these theories through cognitive fallacies such as 
reification, essentialism, entitativism, stereotyping, misleading generalizing, 
etc. This usually goes hand in hand with a failure to adopt social constructivist 
epistemological points of  departure that inform most of  the current critical 
social theory. Presumably, most of  the constructionist-improper historians will 
be direct realists. Constructionism-proper is in fact formally congruent with 
the category of  constructionism as Munslow originally defined it, but with 
an important distinction as far as the elementary ontological/epistemological 
position of  historians falling into this category is concerned. The successful 
adoption of  critical social theory alongside social constructivist epistemological 
presuppositions would indicate an impositionalist epistemological position. 
To put it metaphorically, a constructionist-improper historian is someone 
who abandons the reconstructionist positions and sets out to become a 
constructionist-proper type of  historian, but who for some reason gets stuck 
somewhere on the road.
I realize that this seems an arbitrary split, and perhaps several other 
subcategories of  constructionism could be delineated. I also admit that, like 
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Munslow’s categories, at first sight my categories might also seem too ideal-
typical for analytical purposes. Their full potential reveals itself  when another 
important factor, which Munslow omitted altogether, is considered: the social 
functions of  history. I argue that particular functionalities of  knowledge about 
the past (of  which historians are the primary producers and, in principle, 
the guarantors of  its truthfulness) in the social lives of  modern societies are 
dependent on naïve realist and acritical empiricist (direct realist in Zeleňák’s 
terms) thinking. Moreover, I argue that national histories in the traditional sense 
necessarily must be narrative, since narrative is the “natural” form through 
which people are inclined to make sense of  their being in the past, present, 
and future. Furthermore, to function as natural frames of  self-identification, 
national histories need to be based on (among other things) a reifying concept 
of  nation and an essentialist concept of  nationality, ethnicity, race, and other 
related social categorizations. I suggest that there is a direct connection between 
the social functionalities of  history and the continued prevalence of  the direct 
realist, i.e. reconstructionist and constructionist-improper modes of  history 
writing. By including in our studies of  epistemology in historiography in 
connection with the practice of  scholarly history writing the non-professional 
person as a consumer of  history and the social functionalities of  history (and 
the institutionalized modes of  realizing these functionalities), we can potentially 
gain entirely new perspectives on certain intra-disciplinary phenomena, such as 
the continued thriving of  an obsolete epistemology despite decades of  intense 
and plausible criticism.
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